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Abstract
We analyse risk-taking behaviour of banks in the context of a model based on spatial
competition. Banks mobilise deposits by oering deposit rates. We show that when the
market concentration is low, banks invest in the gambling asset. On the other hand,
for suciently high levels of market concentration, all banks choose the prudent asset to
invest in, and some depositors may even be left out of the market. Our results suggest a
discontinuous relation between market concentration and social welfare.
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When banks are able to raise deposits to invest in assets with uncertain returns, excessive
deposit might induce banks to take more risk. Involvement in high risk activities is viewed
as one of the principal causes of several instances of banking crises that the world economy
has witnessed during the last two decades.1
The main goal of this paper is to analyse the role of market concentration in determining
the risk-taking behaviour of banks. The banking sector described here consists of a nite
number of banks. Banks are identical with respect to their equity capital. They raise deposits
by oering deposit rates. Banks choose between a prudent asset and a gambling asset to
invest their total fund (equity plus deposit). The gambling asset on average yields lower
return than the prudent asset, but if the gambling is successful it gives higher return. There
is a continuum of depositors. The depositors have one unit of monetary fund apiece, which
they may place in a bank to earn the deposit rate oered. The depositors are not insured in
case the gamble fails.
We analyse a model of bank competition in the context of a circular city model  a la
Salop[7]. Both the banks and the depositors are located uniformly on a unit circle. The
depositors incur a per unit transport cost to travel to a bank. In this model banks compete
in deposit rates and each bank enjoys certain market power in the deposit market. We
introduce an element of product dierentiation across banks. Market power stems from
transportation cost. The transport cost should not literally be interpreted as the cost (or,
time) a depositor spends travelling to a bank. Banks could be dierentiated because of
dierences in ATM facilities, availability in various regions, internet banking services, etc.2
In general, most of our ndings do not depend particularly on the source of market power.
1Recall the great S&L debacle in the United States. In 1985 S&L failures in Maryland caused loss to state
deposit insurance fund and Maryland taxpayers of $185 million. The country-wide crisis had a cost of about
$600 billion in bailouts.
2Sometimes banks gift frying pans or wine glasses to their clients.
2What is more important is that the amount of deposit in each bank is a continuous function of
the deposit rates oered by him and his rivals. Our objective is to analyse the eects of market
concentration, and not to model its sources. Ours is possibly one of the simplest formulations
in order to capture the essence of a monopolistically competitive market structure.
Two types of symmetric equilibria might arise. A prudent equilibrium, where all banks
invest in the prudent asset, and a gambling equilibrium, where all banks invest in the gambling
asset. We use the unit transport cost relative to the number of banks as a measure of market
concentration. We characterise the equilibrium of the banking sector. We show that when
concentration is low, banks compete aggressively in order to capture greater market share
by oering higher deposit rates. In this case, all the depositors participate, and a covered
market is said to arise. Here, for very low concentration, all banks invest in the Gambling
asset (i.e., a Covered Gambling Equilibrium exists). As concentration increases, all banks
investing in the prudent asset can also be supported in equilibrium (i.e., a Covered Prudent
Equilibrium co-exists along with a Covered Gambling Equilibrium).
For high levels of market concentration, banks never invest in the gambling asset. This
is because the banks are interested in preserving the higher rent, which stems from increased
market power, by behaving prudently. Hence, for moderately high concentration, competition
with banks investing in the prudent asset is the only equilibrium. For even higher levels of
concentration, a uncovered market emerges where deposit rate is so low that some depositors
nd it unprotable to place their funds in banks and prefer to stay out of the deposit market.
To summarise, we show that higher market concentration is eciency enhancing. As
market concentration increases, the resulting lower competition induces banks to invest only
in the prudent asset.
The equilibrium outcomes of the market also have signicant implications for social wel-
fare. It is clear that, for a xed level of equity capital and a given level of concentration,
social welfare under a prudent equilibrium is higher than that under a gambling equilibrium
3(when both co-exist for these levels). In the characterisation equilibrium we show that be-
yond a certain level of market concentration a gambling equilibrium ceases to exist. Hence,
at this particular level of concentration social welfare has a discontinuous leap. Although,
quite naturally welfare decreases as market concentration increases.
Prudential regulations of banks are viewed as instruments to prohibit banks from in-
vesting in risky projects. To this end, several mechanisms are used by the central banking
authorities. Two popular instruments are minimum capital requirements and deposit rate
ceilings which are often used to curb erce competition among banks. Hellmann, Murdock
and Stiglitz[4] show, using a dynamic model of prudential regulation, that freely determined
deposit rates are inconsistent with Pareto eciency, and that an optimal regulation policy
combines minimum capital requirements and deposit rate ceiling. Repullo[6] uses a dynamic
model of banking based on spatial competition  a la Salop[7], to show that for very low levels
of market concentration all banks invest only in the gambling asset if there is no regulation.
Chiaporri, P erez-Castrillo and Verdier[1] analyse the regulation of deposit rates in a circular
city model of bank competition in both the deposit and loan markets.
Apart from the above two measures, central banks often insure the depositors in case of
bank failure. Diamond and Dybvig[3] nd that deposit insurance system prevents sunspot
runs.3 With deposit insurance, Depositors become (ex-ante) indierent between placing their
funds in a prudent bank and a gambling bank. On the other hand, deposit insurance reduces
bank's incentives to behave prudently by increasing the moral hazard at the bank level when
they are protected by a limited liability clause. Hence, the eect of deposit insurance on social
welfare remains ambiguous. Demirg u c-Kunt and Detragiache[2] nd empirical evidence that
explicit deposit insurance has provoked bank failure.
Another goal of the paper is to analyse a scenario where the depositors are not insured.
It is clear that the banks will invest in the prudent asset only if they earn higher prots
3Capturing the phenomenon of bank run, which is associated with withdrawal of funds by the depositors,
is beyond the scope of our model which is a static one.
4from doing so. This condition crucially depends on the network size (i.e., the number of
depositors) of each bank. We show that if there are too many depositors with a particular
bank he is more likely to gamble. In a regime of full deposit insurance, the depositors are paid
back the promised deposit rates; whereas under no deposit insurance when a bank gambles
his depositors are paid o less (in expected terms) compared to a prudent bank. Hence,
depositors preferences for banks depend not only on the deposit rates posted by all banks,
but also on the network size of each bank which gives rise to a coordination problem among
the depositors. Comparing our ndings with that of a deposit insurance system we show that
when the depositors are insured, a gambling equilibrium is more likely to occur.
The current setup is closest to that of Repullo[6] and Keeley[5]. The latter shows, using
a static model, that increased competition may lead to higher risk-taking in banking. We
also use a static model assuming away any sort of deposit insurance. Standard portfolio
choice theory asserts that positive risk premium (the dierence between the expected return
from the risky asset and the return from the safe asset) is necessary to induce (risk averse)
individuals to invest positive amount in a risky asset. In the current model with negative
risk premium, a gambling equilibrium might arise since a successful gamble yields more than
a prudent asset. Hence, in order to ensure a prudent equilibrium, one needs an additional
restriction that, given deposit rates and total volume of deposit, the prot from investing in
the prudent asset must exceeds that from the gambling asset (the No Gambling Condition).
In our model, banks invest all their equity capital. This can be thought as if there is xed
capital standard posed by a regulatory authority. But, as Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz[4]
show, capital requirements are not enough to achieve Pareto eciency unless combined with
deposit rate ceiling. In our model, unlike their work, total volume of deposit with a bank
determines whether bank is going to choose a gambling asset or a prudent asset. Hence, the
uninsured depositors play a major role in determining banks' risk-taking behaviour.
The main body of the paper shows that increased market concentration ensures that all
banks invest in the prudent asset. Much of the debates on bank mergers pose the view
5that mergers are able to enhance eciency in case of speculative lending by providing the
banks with more market power. One important thing to note is that our results would dier
signicantly if we allowed the number of banks to vary. One appropriate way to do this is
accommodating entry of new banks in a dynamic context. But, in our understanding, market
concentration is essentially a short run concept since, with free entry, the market power each
bank enjoys is merely temporary. Su arez and Perotti[8] show that, in the presence of last
bank standing eects, appropriate mergers and regulatory policies can enhance eciency by
giving banks incentives to behave prudently.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we lay out the basic model. In the next
section, we analyse prudent and gambling equilibria. In Section 4, we discuss the relation
between market concentration and social welfare. We conclude in Section 5.
2 The Model
Consider a banking sector with n risk neutral banks distributed uniformly on a unit circle. A
bank i has equity capital k which is assumed to of xed amount. Banks compete in deposit
rates in order to mobilise deposit. Let r = (r1; :::; ri; :::; rn) be the deposit rates oered by
the banks. Bank i's demand for deposit is given by D(ri; r i), r i being the rates oered by
the other banks. Banks invest in assets their deposits together with the equity capital.
There is a continuum of depositors, also uniformly distributed on the unit circle, with
a unit of fund apiece. A depositor can deposit her fund in a bank and earns deposit rate
next period. We assume away any sort of deposit insurance.4 A depositor incurs a per unit
transport cost t to travel to a bank.
Banks can choose between a prudent asset and a gambling asset to invest their total fund.
The prudent asset yields a constant return , and the gambling asset gives a return 
 with
4In Section ? we comment on deposit insurance.
6probability  and zero with probability 1   . The prudent asset has higher expected return
( > 
), but if the gamble pays o it yields higher private return (
 > ). The bank invests
k + D(ri; r i) in an asset.5
If bank i chooses to invest in prudent and the gambling assets then his expected prots,
respectively are:
P(ri; r i; k) = k + (   ri)D(ri; r i);
G(ri; r i; k) = (
k + (
   ri)D(ri; r i)):
The timing of the game is as follows: Banks simultaneously oer deposit rates. Depositors
then choose the bank in which to deposit their funds. The deposit mobilisation is followed
by the portfolio choice by the banks. Finally, project outputs are realised and the depositors
are paid.
3 Equilibrium
In this section, we characterise the equilibrium of the economy where banks compete in the
deposit market by oering deposit rates and choose a prudent asset or a gambling asset to
invest in, and the depositors choose banks to place their funds. We will focus on two types of
symmetric equilibria. A prudent equilibrium, where all banks choose to invest in the prudent
asset, and a gambling equilibrium, where all banks invest in the gambling asset. The natural
solution concept used here is Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. Since, the depositors have to incur
a per unit transport cost t to travel to a bank, the transport cost relative to the number of
banks in the economy ( t
n) can be used as a proper measure of market concentration.6 This
is because, if the transport cost increases relative to the number of banks, given the total
5We may assume that a bank can invest a fraction of total capital in each asset. It is easy to show that
optimality would imply that banks choose only one asset to invest in.
6See Salop[7].
7number of depositors, each bank can lower the deposit rate to earn higher rent.
When market concentration is relatively low, there is no depositor who nds it protable
not to place her fund in any of the banks. In this case, all the depositors are served and a
covered market is said to arise. On the other hand, when the transport cost relative to the
number of banks is very high, there might be some depositors who, in equilibrium, would
not nd it protable to travel to a bank to place their fund (since, deposit rate would not be
high enough in order to compensate for the increased travelling cost). In that case, we say
that an uncovered market arises. Prior to characterising the equilibrium, we rst analyse the
necessary conditions for existence of prudent and gambling equilibria in both types of market
structures.
Banks will choose to invest in prudent asset if the expected prots from prudent asset
exceeds the expected prots from gambling asset (P  G), i.e., if the deposit of a bank
satises the following No Gambling Condition.
Di 
mk
(1   )ri   m
; (NGC)
where m =  
. We assume that (1 ) m > 0 in order that the term in the right hand
side of the above inequality is positive. If the above inequality is reversed, i.e., a Gambling
Condition (call that (GC)) holds, then an individual bank will invest in the gambling asset.
Now recall the timing of events. The above conditions (NGC and GC) determine banks'
portfolio choice which follows the decision taken by the depositors. If there is a small number
of depositors place their funds in a particular bank, then this bank is more likely to invest in
the prudent asset (since, (NGC) is more likely to be satised). Hence, the conditions (NGC)
and (GC) are endogenous, rather than being exogenous constraints. In a regime where the
depositors are not insured in case of bank failure, this fact bears important consequences
on the market equilibria. If there was deposit insurance, the depositors would have been
indierent between banks investing in the prudent asset and in the gambling asset.
83.1 A Covered Market
A covered market is a situation where all the depositors place their funds in any of the n
banks rather than keeping their funds idle.
First, consider a Covered Prudent Equilibrium (CPE).7 We rst compute the demand for
deposit issued by bank i when he oers ri and all the other banks oer r. If the depositors
anticipate that all banks are going to choose the prudent asset, then the demand for deposit








Here, one should take two restrictions into account. First, all the banks must comply with
the No Gambling Condition in order that the market structure arises at equilibrium is indeed
a prudent equilibrium. Second, there is no depositor who has an incentive to keep her fund
idle, i.e., for any depositor at a distance x from any bank one must have i, ri  1  tx. This

















subject to (NGC) and (PC):
Let ri = r = rCP be the candidate optima for the above maximisation problem, which are
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> > > > > > :
 r if t
n      r
   t








n  2( r   1);
where  r =
m(1+nk)
1  is the deposit rate which makes the (NGC) bind with equal deposit for
all banks. In order to interprete the above, rst consider the corner solution  r. This deposit
rate must satisfy (PC), which implies t
n  2( r 1). Also at  r, the prot function must have a
non-negative slope which implies t
n     r. Then consider the interior solution   t
n. This
must satisfy both (NGC) and (PC), which implies     r  t
n 
2( 1)






which must satisfy (NGC) and at this point the prot function
must have a negative slope. These two together implies that
2( 1)
3  t
n  2( r   1). And
also, a symmetric CPE exists only if
t
n
 2( r   1)  P;
Next, we analyse the Covered Gambling Equilibrium (CGE). Note that if a bank i
promises a deposit rate ri, a depositor in this bank gets (in expected terms) ri.8 If the
depositors anticipate that all banks are going to choose the gambling asset, the deposit of








8Here we consider a banking sector where the depositors are not insured. Had there been deposit insurance
system, the depositors would have received the promised deposit rate ri, and hence the demand function
faced by the banks would not change. In this model, since deposit mobilisation is followed by banks' portfolio
choice, the depositors in a way in
uence the (NGC). Because the depositors choose banks simultaneously, a
coordination problem among them arises in this stage.














subject to (GC) and (PC):
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n  2( r   1)
First consider the interior solution 
   t
n. This must satisfy both the reversed (NGC) and
(PC), which implies t
n  (




3 . Then consider the corner solution  r.
This deposit rate must satisfy (PC), which implies t
n  2( r   1). Also at  r, the prot
function must have a negative slope which implies t
n  (







which must satisfy the reversed (NGC) and at this point the prot
function must have a negative slope. These two together imply that t
n  2( r 1). In Section
3.3 we will show that the corner solutions can be ruled out.
3.2 An Uncovered Market
In an uncovered market between any two consecutive banks on the circle there is a non-
empty subset of depositors who do not place their funds in either of the banks. Consider a
bank i oering deposit rate ri. A depositor at distance x from i will prefer to stay home if
ri   1 < tx. Hence, bank i will get a maximum deposit of x  ri 1
t from either side and he
9For a gambling equilibrium, we need that for no bank the (NGC) is satised.





In this section, we focus on two possible kinds of equilibria: an Uncovered Prudent Equilib-
rium (UPE) and an Uncovered Gambling Equilibrium (UGE).
First, we look for the conditions under which does a UPE exist. In such equilibrium,
banks simply maximise prots subject to the No Gambling Condition, and the No Partici-
pation Constraint.10 Since banks oer deposit rate which is independent of the other banks'
decisions, it is sucient to check that the depositor at x = 1
2n does not deposit in either of
the banks. Hence, the No Participation Constraint boils down to













subject to (NGC) and (NPC):




> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
1 + t
2n if t
n  minf   1; 2(~ r   1)g;
~ r if t
n  2(~ r   1) and    1  2(~ r   1);
+1
2 if t
n     1 and    1  2(~ r   1);
10In case of an uncovered market, the Participation Constraint must be reversed.
12where ~ r is dened by:




(1   )~ r   m
:
Note that when t
n  minf   1; 2(~ r   1)g, the deposit rate oered by a bank is rMP =
min
+1
2 ; ~ r
	
. This form of deposit rate depends on the slope of the prot function at ~ r. If
~ r  +1
2 , then the slope is negative, and hence the deposit rate that maximises bank's prot
is simply +1
2 .11 Also a UPE exists only if:
t
n
 minf   1; 2( r   1)g   P:
In the rest of this section, we analyse the Uncovered Gambling Equilibrium (UGE).12
Bank i, operates on the part of the demand curve
2(ri 1)
t above mk
(1 )ri m (i.e., No Gambling
Condition is reversed). Also, in this case, the No Participation Constraint is slightly dierent





















subject to (GC) and (NPC0):
11Notice that when r
UP = 1+
t
2n, this is same as a CPE with deposit rate 1+
t
2n. Hence, the part of UPE,
when
t
n  minf   1; 2(~ r   1)g, will be referred to as a CPE.
12While interpreting the above necessary conditions, notice that ~ r is a function of
t
n. After several steps of
tedious algebra one can show that
t
n  2(~ r   1) if and only if
t
n  2( r   1).
13The candidates for ri = r = rUG are
rUG =
8
> > > > > > <
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   1 and 
   1  2(^ r   1);
where ^ r is dened by:

















In the following proposition, we show that none of the candidates for rUG can constitute an
equilibrium.13
Proposition 1 An Uncovered Gambling Equilibrium never exists.
Proof We are going to provide one deviation from each of the above candidates, ^ r and

+1
2 . All these deviations have the common feature of generating same deposits as the
candidates they deviate from.
First consider the deposit rate ^ r. A bank would be strictly better o by choosing a
prudent asset and oering a deposit rate ^ r. Hence, the UGE with deposit rate ^ r cannot
survive as an equilibrium. Next, consider the deposit rate

+1
2 . In the similar fashion, this
is also dominated (in terms of prots) by a deposit rate

+1
2 and a bank choosing a prudent
asset.
The only thing remains to be checked is that any non-participant who can alter bank's
investment decision will stay out. This may happen only when rUP = ~ r (when (NGC) is








will be called a CGE.
14binding). Let x be the maximum distance that a depositor travels from. We call x the
marginal consumer, for whom tx = ~ r   1. She will not participate if ^ r   1  tx. Hence, it
is sucient to show that ^ r   ~ r  0. This is always true, since m > 0 and  < 1. 
Till now we have provided only the necessary conditions for the existence of dierent
types of equilibria and showed that an UGE never exists. In the following section, we also
provide the sucient conditions for existence.
3.3 Characterisation of Equilibrium
In the following proposition, we characterise the equilibrium. Recall that the term t
n is used
as a measure of market concentration.
Proposition 2 For a given level equity capital of each bank, k,
(a) there exists a threshold ~  such that if t
n  ~  (low market concentration), only the Com-




n 2 [~ ; G] (intermediate levels of market concentration), both a Competitive Gambling
Equilibrium and a Competitive Prudent Equilibrium exist, with banks oering 
   t
n, and  r
or    t
n, respectively;
(c) if t
n 2 [G;  P] (moderately high levels of concentration), only Competitive Prudent Equi-
librium exists, with banks oering    t
n or 1 + t
2n ;
(d) if t
n   P (very high concentration), only Monopoly Prudent Equilibrium exists, with
banks oering +1
2 or ~ r.







. Notice that this deposit rate is optimal only if t
n  2( r   1). It is easy










. Hence, a bank will have incentive to reduce
15the deposit rate, attracting the same deposit, and becoming a local (prudent) monopolist.
Next, when the deposit rate  r is a candidate optimum, a bank can gain strictly higher prot
by reducing the deposit rate to r0 =  r
, attracting the same demand, and switching to prudent
asset. Hence, only the interior optimum survives. In this region, no bank can gain by oering









    r)

 G:
Next, there exists a threshold value ~       r such that if t
n  ~ ,14 a bank will nd it
protable to switch to a gambling asset by oering a deposit rate which is his best response
to  r. Hence, for t
n  ~ , there is no CPE.
Recall that  P  minf   1; 2( r   1)g = minf   1; Pg. Therefore, CPE and MPE
might co-exist if    1 < P. However, this does not occur, since a bank has incentive to
choose to become a local monopolist by oering a deposit rate +1
2 . In this region, no bank
can gain by oering a dierent deposit rate and choosing a gambling asset. Therefore, a





Notice that if ~  < G, then CPE and CGE do not exist together.
Finally, when t
n   P, only MPE exists since, by Proposition 1,there is no MGE. 
The intuition behind the above proposition is fairly straightforward. When the market
concentration is very low, competition erodes banks' prot, thus leaving little incentive for
them to invest in prudent asset. Also, with erce competition, banks oer high deposit
rate which compensate for the travelling cost of the depositors (although they receive only 
14The threshold is given by ~  
p
(1   ) r  
p
(
    r)
2
.
16fraction of it). On the other hand, for very high degree of concentration, banks gain monopoly
rent, and hence they have incentive to choose prudent asset in order to preserve that. For,
even a higher values of t
n, the market becomes monopolistic, i.e., banks oer even lower
deposit rate which is not conducive to attract the depositors located at a longer distance.
The above proposition is summarised in the following gure.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Also, for intermediate levels of concentration, banks might invest in the prudent asset by
oering a lower deposit rate or in the gambling asset oering a higher rate which compensates
for the expected loss for the depositors due to a possible failure in gambling.
4 Social Welfare
In this section, we discuss the connection between market concentration and welfare. In the
current set up social welfare is simply the total consumer's surplus, since the deposit rate is
transfer from the banks to the depositors.
For covered markets welfare is independent of deposit rates














Hence, in a covered market social welfare is always higher under the prudent equilibrium,15
since
WCPE   WCGE = m(nk + 1) > 0:
15One interesting result would be if W
CPE(ne ) < W
CGE(0): However, this does not always hold true since
depend on the value of the parameters.
17For the UPE take the case where the equilibrium deposit rate is rUP = +1
2 . Let xI be the
last consumer who deposits with a bank. Hence, xI must satisfy the following:
 + 1
2








, and the social welfare is given by:


















So if the lower bound on concentration beyond which we have a UPE is  1; one can show
that
WUP((   1)n) = W CPE((   1)n)
Once can do the same with the other equilibrium candidate 2(e r   1).
The above can be summarised as follows. First, social welfare decreases with the level of
market concentration. Second, for a given level of market concentration where both the CPE
and CGE exist (for t
n 2 [~ ; G]), social welfare is higher in case all banks behaving prudently.
Next, at the level of concentration beyond which no bank invests in the gambling asset (at
t
n = G), welfare takes a discontinuous leap.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we use a model of baking sector based on spatial competition, and analyse
the role of market concentration in in
uencing the risk-taking behaviour of banks. Using a
18static model we show that, for a very low level of market concentration, banks invest in the
gambling asset. On the other hand, when the market concentration increases, banks invest
only in the prudent asset. We assert that, more market concentration works as a device
to refrain banks from being involved in high risk activities. We also show a discontinuous
relationship between concentration and social welfare.
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